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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOHN RUSSO and ROBERT RUSSO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,

]
]
])

v.

BRIDLEWOOD CORPORATION,

Case No. 860457

]

Defendant-Respondent.

]

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

The following issues of law are presented within the Brief
of Appellant:
(1)

Did the Bridlewood Corporation, as seller,

intentionally conceal from the Russos information that the
restaurant property contained significant soil stability and
slope defects?

A material component of this legal issue is

whether or not the Russos1 retained real estate agent acquired
sufficient notice or knowledge from the seller's listing agent of
the slope stability defects on the property so that the
Russos1 damages are not the proximate result of the seller's
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intentional concealment of material facts.
(2)

Did the Bridlewood Corporation, as seller, either

individually or through its listing real estate agent,
negligently fail to investigate and to disclose to the Russos
that the restaurant property contained significant slope
stability defects?

A material component of this legal issue is

whether or not the Russos1 retained real estate agent
acquired sufficient notice or knowledge from the seller's listing
agent of the soil stability defects so that the Russos' damages
are not the proximate result of the negligent conduct of the
seller or of its listing agent.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Russos commenced this action following their February
6, 1984 purchase from the Bridlewood Corporation of certain
improved commercial real property upon which the Russos
intended to operate a restaurant business.

The Russos

discovered during the Spring of 1984, for the first time, that
slope slippage had occurred on the east side of the restaurant
property related to general slope failure along the west side of
the adjacent Birch Creek gully.
A two day non-jury trial was held in the Weber County
District Court from May 22, 1986 through May 23, 1986, the
Honorable David E. Roth, District Judge, presiding.

The case was

tried to the trial court upon the multiple theories Bridlewood's
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intentional concealment of material facts and of its negligent
failure to investigate and to disclose material facts both
individually and through its listing agent, Robert Penton.

The

trial court entered a June 11, 1986 Memorandum Decision which
concluded in material part that:
(1)

The RussosT real estate agent was provided with

sufficient information of slope failure on the property from the
seller's listing agent to obligate him to disclose this acquired
information to the Russos and to further investigate,
(2)

The acquired knowledge of the Russos1 real estate

agent was fully chargeable to them as was the acquired knowledge
of the seller's listing agent.
(3)

The failure of the Russos' real estate agent to

disclose to them the information which he had acquired and his
failure to further investigate was the sole proximate cause of
the Russos' damages.

(Tr. at 101 - 104).

Conforming Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment were
entered on August 12, 1986 by which each cause of action within
the Plaintiffs' Complaint was dismissed, no cause of action.
(Tr. at 112 - 118, 147).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The real property in this action is located at 440 East
4400 South, Ogden, Utah.

The property contains .75 acres and is

rectangular in shape with its south facing length fronting on
4400 South.

A restaurant designed and furnished rectangular

shaped 3,700 square foot cinderblock and frame building is
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located on the property.
faces 4400 South.

The south facing length of the building

An asphalt surface parking lot extends from

the front of the building approximately seventy-five feet to 4400
South.

The east side boundary of the property is marked by chain

link fence which traverses the crest of the west slope of the
Birch Creek Gully.

The Birch Creek Gully is a deep and steep

sided intermittent stream created gully.

The gully extends at

extreme depth for several hundred yards north of the restaurant
property to State Road 89 and for several hundred yards south of
the restaurant property and beyond 4400 South.

A waterslide

complex has been built on the Birch Creek slope of the property
immediately to the north of and adjacent to the restaurant
property.

An outside walk-in freezer unit approximately eight

feet by sixteen feet is located along the north (rear) wall of
the restaurant building.

The east end of this freezer unit is

flush with the east wall (side) of the building.

The freezer

unit is located upon a concrete pad of identical size dimensions.
The northeast corner of the building is approximately twenty feet
from the crest of the west slope of the Birch Creek Gully.

The

east side yard has neither been graded nor asphalted with the
result that it is neither a public access nor personnel access to
the rear entrance of the building.

All personnel access to the

rear (north side) of the building is made from the west side of
the property which is asphalted and which further functions as a
road right-of-way to the adjacent waterslide property.
The liability and damages issues in this action derive

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from a pattern of Birch Creek Gully slope failure along the east
side yard of the restaurant property.

This failure pattern

extends for several hundred yards to the south and to the north
of the restaurant property along the west slope of the Birch
Creek Gully.
During those times material to this action, the slope
failure pattern along the east side of the restaurant building
had been evidenced by a radiating line of earth slippage which
began in the parking lot approximately twenty feet in front
(south) of the building and approximately twenty feet from the
crest of the Birch Creek Gully.

The slippage line extended

approximately thirty feet in an unbroken line parallel to the
crest of the Birch Creek Gully to where it intersected the
building's east foundation wall about ten feet from its northeast
corner.

The slippage continued under the east end of the walk-in

freezer concrete pad, northward across the adjacent waterslide
property and further northward into the hard surfaced
right-of-way of State Road 89.
At the time of the May 1986 trial, the slippage had
increased to an approximate two foot depth where it intersected
the building's foundation and thereafter passed under the
concrete freezer pad and beyond the north property boundary.
Slope failure along the west slope of the Birch Creek
Gully is continuing and will encroach further westward into the
restaurant property.

(Ex.7, 22). The result of this continuing
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slope failure along the east side of the property is that major
slope failure is projected to occur under the foundation of the
restaurant building within the following ten years.
23).

(Ex. 7, 22,

This event will structurally condemn the facility.

(Ex. 7 ) .

The known condition of the property has disqualified it for
landslide/disaster insurance coverage, for long term secured
lender financing and has rendered the property unsuitable for a
replacement structure which can comply with controlling zoning
ordinance set back requirements for the usable boundaries of the
property.

(Tr. at 349, 365 - 366). The combined impact of slope

failure, disqualification from insurance coverage, and
disqualification from secured lender financing has rendered the
property financially worthless to a prospective purchaser (Tr. at
365 - 366; Ex. 14). The Russos have applied in excess of
$19,000.00 toward the improvement of the building, for the
acquisition of restaurant equipment, for advertising signs and
fixtures and have paid real property taxes totalling 06,068.40
for fiscal years 1984 and 1985.

(Tr. at 328 - 334; Ex. 11, 12,

13, 17).
The Defendant, Bridlewood Corporation, sold the restaurant
property to the Russos on February 6, 1984 for $177,000.00
against which the Russos applied a $20,000.00 down payment.
at 310; Ex. 15). Terms of sale provide for sixty monthly
installments of $1,363.05 commencing April 1, 1984 with the
entire unpaid balance of principal and interest to be paid in
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(Tr.

full not later than March 1989.

(Ex. 25).

Bridlewood Corporation is a foreign corporation with its
principal place of business in Illinois.

The sole contact which

the corporation has had with the State of Utah has been its
ownership of the restaurant property.

The president of

Bridlewood Corporation and its sole shareholder is Clinton E.
Frank.

For purposes of this litigation, the conduct of the

corporation has always been the conduct of its president, Mr.
Frank, who is also an Illinois resident.
The restaurant property was placed by Frank for sale
during August 1980 with Rick J. Wadraan, an Ogden, Utah real
estate broker.

(Tr. at 193). The building, outside freezer

unit, parking lot and boundary lines appeared then as they did at
trial.

Frank allowed the Wadraan listing to expire without being

renewed on December 31, 1983.

He thereafter placed the listing

with Realty World Abide and one of its Ogden, Utah agents, Robert
Penton.

(Tr. at 238). The Realty World Abide listing went into

effect on January 1, 1984 and was in place when the property was
sold to the Russos on February 6, 1984.
The original listing agent, Rick Wadraan, discovered the
radiating soils slippage line on the east side of the restaurant
building soon after he acquired his August 14, 1980 listing.
(Tr. at 199). At that time, the depth of the slippage was not
more than six inches where it intersected the northeast corner
area of the building. (Tr. at 201). Wadman further observed that
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this radiating slippage line had cracked the east end of the
concrete pad for the walk-in freezer but no further damage was
evident.

(Tr. at 203).

Wadman ordered from Frank, during November 1982, a written
real estate appraisal for the restaurant property.

(Tr. at 199).

The completed November 1982 appraisal provided in material part:
. . .

there is a crack in the earth on the east side.
There has been some slippage here and the separation
extends back to and through the waterslide in the back.
This slippage occurred several years ago. One cannot
predict what will happen in the future, but it may
have stabilized. (Ex. 3; Tr. at 162 - 163).
The appraisal report likewise contained a photograph of the
described condition.

(Ex. 3 ) .

Wadman did not believe that the November 1982 appraisal
impacted adversely the value or desirability of the property in
that the report described a condition which had existed unchanged
on the property since August 1980.
report was received by Frank.

(Tr. at 200). A copy of the

(Tr. at 164).

Wadmanfs first concern with slope stability on the east
side of the property occurred during June 1983 when he inspected
the property at that time.

(Tr. at 200). The radiating slippage

line continued to be approximately thirty feet long but the depth
of the slippage had deteriorated to a depth of not less than one
foot where the slippage line intersected the buildingfs
foundation and the east end of the concrete paid had completely
fractured and had dropped approximately one foot.

(Tr. at 201 -
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204).

Wadman saw that a significant length of the west slope of

the Birch Creek Gully was slipping over an area about two hundred
yards south of 4400 South and northward from the restaurant
property to State Road 89.

(Tr. at 204 - 205). Wadman coupled

his observations of the ^restaurant property and of the west slope
of the Birch Creek Gully with recently received television and
newspaper reports that the heavy snow fall during the 1983/84
winter season was then producing slope movement along the length
of the Birch Creek Gully.

(Tr. at 201).

Wadman immediately telephoned Frank and described to Frank
what he had seen on the restaurant property within the adjacent
Birch Creek Gully area and what he had learned about the Birch
Creek Gully from television reports and newspaper articles.

(Tr.

at 207). Wadman next sought by telephone the advise of a
consulting engineer, a Mr. Adamson.

(Tr. at 207). Adamson told

Wadman that the entire west slope of the Birch Creek Gully was
"sluffing off, as a general rule".

(Tr. at 207 - 208).

Frank traveled to Utah on July 24, 1983 and personally
inspected the restaurant property with Wadman.

(Tr. at 208).

The inspection lasted approximately one-half hour.

(Tr. at 209).

Wadman showed Frank the radiating slippage line on the property
and informed him that its depth had doubled since November 1982.
(Tr. at 208). Wadman again recounted to Frank the contents of
the newspaper articles and television segments which had covered
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to date the slope failure occuring along the west slope of the
Birch Creek Gully drainage area and his own observations of the
west slope of the gully.

Wadman further showed Frank, for the

first time, an area of soil erosion in the vicinity of the
northeast corner of the property.

(Tr. at 210 - 211). Erosion

had been created by water flowing from a roof drainpipe, the end
of which was placed at the crest of the gully.

(Tr. at 210).

The erosion was located under the pipe and extended for a
distance down the face of the gully's west slope.
212).

(Tr. at 210 -

Wadman told Frank that both the value and desirability of

the property could be adversely impacted by what they had each
observed, notwithstanding that purchase offers were being
received for the property.

(Tr. at 211). Wadman informed Frank

that his listing real estate broker obligations required him to
disclose to each subsequent prospective purchaser what he knew of
the nature and extent of the slope failure and erosion condition
along the east boundary of the restaurant property.

(Tr. at

210).
Wadman inspected for approximately twenty minutes the
restaurant property with Adamson on July 29, 1983 and after Frank
had returned to Illinois.

(Tr. at 212). Adamson informed Wadman

that the slope failure along the east boundary of the property
was part of the general slope failure pattern then occuring along
the entire west slope of the Birch Creek Gully drainage area and
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that the slippage pattern on the property and along the west
slope of the gully could not be corrected but was symptomatic of
the saturated clay soils of the gully sliding horizontally along
the underlying hard rock strata.

(Tr. at 212 - 213). Adamson

stated that the slope failure had been ongoing for the past fifty
to one hundred years and could damage the restaurant building if
the area continued to receive heavy water years like the 1983/84
winter.

(Tr. at 213). Adamson concluded that the east side of

the restaurant property could experience further slope failure
within one year or not for the next fifty to one hundred years it was a judgment call that he as not willing to predict.
(Tr. at 213). The engineer emphasized that the placement of fill
dirt on the east side of the property to return it to grade and
limited asphalt resurfacing would be cosmetic repair only which
would not defeat the underlying slope failure mechanisms.

(Tr.

at 213 - 214).
Wadman telephoned Frank in Illinois and told him the
contents of his meeting with Adamson.

(Tr. at 214). Wadman then

recommended that Frank cosmetically repair for an estimated
$15,000.00 the east side of the property with fill dirt, extend
the roof drainpipe beyond the crest of the gully and asphalt
resurface.

Frank refused this proposal because he wanted the

property sold in its then condition without further financial
expenditures or financial demands being imposed.

(Tr. at 216)

Frank did not return to the restaurant property following his
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I
July 24, 1983 Utah trip until after the commencement of this
action.
Robert Penton became the listing agent for the restaurant
property on January 1, 1984.

(Tr. at 238). All listing

documents were exchanged by mail between Frank and Penton.
at 239)-

(Tr.

Penton never met Frank personally during the time he

held the listing for the restaurant property or when it was sold
to Russos on February 6, 1984.

(Tr. at 238). All communication

between the two men was by telephone or by written correspondence.
Frank never disclosed to Penton, at any time,

his knowledge of

slope failure on the restaurant property and along the west slope
of the Birch Creek Gully drainage as acquired from Wadman and
from his July 24, 1983 inspection of the property with Wadman.
(Tr. at 243 - 244). At the time the restaurant property listing
was obtained by Penton, approximately two feet of snow had
accummulated on the ground, the building had been vacant for
several months and the parking lot was snow covered and
inaccessible.

(Tr. at 241 - 242). Penton did not inspect the

property outside the restaurant building at the time the lisitng
was obtained and had no knowledge of the earth slippage and soils
erosion conditions along the east side of the building.

(Tr. at

243 - 244).
Robert Russo learned during January 1984 that the
restaurant property was listed for sale.

He retained Mr. Steven

Brown, a real estate agent with the Wardley Corporation of Ogden,
Utah to arrange for an inspection of the property.

(Tr. at 281).
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Brown and Robert Russo thereafter inspected, by themselves, the
restaurant property.

(Tr. at 283). The parking lot at that time

was inaccessible and the entire property was under a two foot
snow cover.

(Tr. at 317). Their inspection included, in

material part, an approximate twenty minute walk around and
inspection of the exterior of the restaurant building.

(Tr. at

283, 317). Neither Robert Russo nor Brown saw under the heavy
snow cover any evidence of slope failure on the east side of the
building or any slope failure along the west slope of the Birch
Creek Gully in either direction from the restaurant property
as had been observed by Frank and described to him by Wadman
during June and July 1983•

(Tr. at 286 - 287, 317). Each of

them together saw, however, in the northeast corner area of the
property and under the chainlink boundary fence a rather
substantial slope erosion which had been caused by washout from
the roof drainpipe (Tr. at 286, 317). This washout area on the
gully slope extended from the crest of the gully, under the
chainlink fence and for a rather a rather substantial distance
along and into the surface of the gully slope.

(Tr. at 287,

317).
The Russos thereafter tendered a purchase offer for the
restaurant property which was accepted by Frank with a minor
change in payment terms.

(Tr. at 288 - 290). The closing was

scheduled by the parties1 realtors for February 6, 1984.
291).
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(Tr. at

Penton met with Wadman at the latterfs office
approximately three to four days prior to the scheduled closing.
(Tr. at 224, 249). Wadman and Penton do not agree why this late
January 1*984 meeting occurred.

(Tr. at 223 - 224, 249 - 250).

Not disputed is that Wadman questioned Penton whether the Russos
knew about the Birch Creek Gully slope failure along the east
boundary of the property.

(Tr. at 224 - 225, 250 - 252). The

restaurant property was thereafter discussed for approximately
one-half hour between the two men.

(Tr. at 225, 252). Wadman

told Penton that the Birch Creek Gully "as a whole was slipping11
and that excessive slippage had occurred on the east side of the
building within the 1982/83 winter.

(Tr. at 224, 225). Wadmanfs

trial testimony was that he described to Penton both the soils
failure pattern on the restaurant property and the general
slippage pattern along the west slope of the Birch Creek Gully in
the same manner which he had observed it individually and with
Frank during June and July 1983.

(Tr. at 224 - 225). Wadman

gave Penton Adamson's name and related to him Adamson's opinion
of why slope failure was occuring on the east side of the
restaurant property and in general along the west slope of the
Birch Creek Gully and that further slope failure on the east side
of the property could occur within the following year or not for
the next fifty to one hundred years.

(Tr. at 223 - 225).

Wadman's January 1984 conversation with Penton was Penton's first
notice from any source that the Birch Creek Gully and the east
side of the restaurant property, in particular, had experienced
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slope failure and slippage.

(Tr. at 258).

Pentonfs testimony of the January 1984 meeting largely,
but not entirely, corresponds with Wadmanfs testimony.

(Tr. at

251 - 252). When Penton left Wadmanfs office, Penton understood
that a certain amount of slippage had occurred under the concrete
freezer pad located at the northeast corner of the building, that
a crack was present in the asphalt surface of the parking lot to
the front of the building and that Adamson had reassured Wadman
that the soils slippage on the property would not cause future
problems.

(Tr. at 251). Penton's perception of Wadman's

information was that soil slippage had occurred on the east side
of the property, at the northeast corner of the building and was
located under the east end of the concrete walk-in freezer pad.
(Tr. at 252 - 253). Penton had no understanding from Wadman's
information that slope failure was located anywhere else on the
property other than under the concrete freezer pad or that the
slippage on the east side of the property was part of general
slope failure occurring along the length of the west slope of the
Birch Creek Gully.

(Tr. at 253 - 254).

Penton traveled to the restaurant property during the late
afternoon of the same day that he conversed with Wadman.
254).

(Tr. at

Penton walked through the snow covered parking lot, along

the east side of the building and directly to the east end of the
concrete freezer pad.

(Tr. at 254 - 257). Penton there saw that
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a six to eight inch width of the east end of the concrete pad had
fractured and had dropped off.

(Tr. at 256 - 258).

Penton

additionally saw the slope erosion under the chainlink fence and
at the crest of the gully in the northeast corner area of the
property caused by washout from the roof drainpipe.

(Tr. at 257).

Penton did not look beyond the immediate area of the concrete pad
for the reason that what he saw underneath the cement pad
reconciled with his understanding of the slippage condition which
Wadman had described to him.

(Tr. at 258).

investigation stopped at that point.

Pentonfs

(Tr. at 259). Penton saw

no other evidence, through the two feet of snow cover, of slope
failure on the east side of the property or in either direction
from the property along the west slope of the Birch Creek Gully.
(Tr. at 258 - 259). Penton's inspection of the east side of the
restaurant property was made in street clothes and shoes and did
not extend beyond five minutes.

(Tr. at 256, 258).

Penton telephoned Brown that same evening and within a ten
minute to fifteen minute telephone call told him that he had
conversed with Wadman earlier that day, that he had visited the
property immediately following his conversation with Wadman and
that he had seen at the northeast corner of the building the
fractured concrete pad and the slippage underneath it.
263).

(Tr. at

Penton gave Adamson's name to Brown and recommended that

Brown disclose to Russos what Penton had seen on the property.
(Tr. at 263).
Brown understood Pentonfs telephoned information to mean
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that Penton had discovered "a problem with slippage" in the
northeast corner of the property.

(Tr. at 291). Brown, however,

understood from Pentonfs description that Penton was describing
the slope erosion under the chainlink boundary fence and at the
crest of the gully caused by washout from the roof drainpipe.
(Tr. at 291 - 293). Brown further understood from Pentonfs
telephone call that Adamson had informed Wadman that the east
side of the property would not experience further slope failure
for fifty to one hundred years.

(Tr. at 291). Brown did not

disclose to Russos the contents of his telephone conversation
with Penton upon the basis that Brown did not believe the
contents of the telephone call disclosed anything not already
known to him and to Robert Russo.

(Tr. at 293).

Brown never contacted Adamson or Wadman for additional or
clarifying information.

(Tr. at 306). Similarly, Penton never

contacted either Frank, Adamson or Wadman (a second time) after
his late January 1984 conversation with Wadman to investigate
further what any of those individuals knew about slope and soil
conditions on the east side of the restaurant property.

(Tr. at

259, 260).
All sales negotiations as well as the February 6, 1984 .
closing were conducted without the real estate agents or the
clients having personally met each other.

(Tr. at 248, 249).

The closing documents contain no disclosures of slope failure and
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earth slippage conditions on the east side of the restaurant
property.

(Tr. at 270). The Russos learned of the earth

slippage and slope failure conditions on the east side of the
property during the Spring months of 1984 and after the snow
cover had melted.

(Tr. at 321).

'

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Russos agree with the Findings of Fact entered by the
trial court as is evidenced by their Statement of Facts in this
appeal brief.

(Tr. at 112 - 116). The Russos, however,

specifically challenge paragraphs three through six of the trial
court's Conclusions of Law upon which judgment was entered in
this action in favor of the Defendant, Bridlewood Corporation,
and against the Russos.

(Tr. at 116 - 118).

The Russos do not disagree with the trial court's
conclusion of law that acts and omissions of their real estate
agent, Steven Brown, are chargeable to them just as the
Bridlewood Corporation is bound by the acts and omissions of its
listing real estate agent, Robert Penton.

What the Russos do

challenge is that:
(a) The contents of Penton's January 1984 telephone call
to Brown was a sufficient disclosure by Bridlewood (the seller)
to the Russos (the buyer) that the east boundary area of the
restaurant property evidenced slope failure and earth slippage
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which materially impacted the property's value and desirability.
(b)

The Bridlewood Corporation and its listing agent,

Penton, discharged their obligations individually and together to
properly investigate and to disclose the nature and extent of
slope failure along the east boundary of the restaurant property
by the contents of Pentonfs late January 1984 telephone call to
Brown.
Under the first argument, the disclosure obligation of the
seller, Bridlewood Corporation, must be measured by what its
president, Clinton E. Frank, knew and not merely by what its
listing agent, Penton, disclosed to the Russos1 agent within the
late January 1984 telephone conversation.

Undisputed is that

Frank never disclosed to Penton his knowledge and personal
observations of slope failure on the east side of the property.
Equally undisputed is that Penton discovered only a fraction of
what Frank had personally observed and what Frank had been told
by the original listing agent, Wadman.

As a matter of law,

Pentonfs disclosures within the January 1984 telephone call to
Brown were inadequate and too incomplete to place Brown (and
hence the Russos) on any form of realistic notice that the value
and desirability of the restaurant property was adversely
impacted by slope failure.
The Russos' second argument is based upon the rule of law
found within Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal.Rptr. 383 (Cal.App.
1 Dist. 1984) that the duty of a listing broker to disclose facts
includes the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent
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and dilligent inspection of the listed real property and to
disclose to the prospective purchaser all facts materially
affecting the value and desirability of the property which such
and investigation would disclose.
The Russos submit that the cited rule of law is applicable
equally to the seller in this action based upon the quantity and
volume of slope failure information which Frank acquired from his
personal observations of the property during July 1983 and from
his June/July 1983 conversations with Wadman.

Notwithstanding,

Frank elected to both ignore the importance of this information
and to further not disclose any part of it to either his listing
agent, Penton, or to the Russos,
The Russos independently urge that Penton (whose conduct
is chargeable to Bridlewood) did not meet his disclosure
obligation to the Russos by his fortuitous conversation with
Wadman, his brief and narrowly focused inspection of the
restaurant property and his telephone conversation with Brown.
Penton discovered only a fraction of what Frank had personally
observed upon the property and what Frank had been told by
Wadman, the former listing agent.
The court ruled as a matter of law that Pentonfs January
1984 telephone conversation with Brown was a sufficient
disclosure to put Brown on sufficient notice to further
investigate and discover.

Brown admittedly did not advise the

Russos of his telephone call with Penton nor did he return to the
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property for further inspection nor did he contact Adamson, the
engineer,

Brownfs conduct, however, is no different from

Penton's.

If Brown had a continuing obligation to investigate

and disclose based upon the contents of Penton's January 1984
telephone call, so did Penton.

Notwithstanding the notice upon

which Penton had been placed, Penton did not communicate with
either Frank or Adamson to further discover the nature and extent
of the slope failure on the propertyfs east boundary, nor did he
return to the property with Brown for further inspection.

The

contents of Penton's January 1984 telephone call to Brown are
inadequate and too incomplete to shift entirely to the Russos the
obligation to discover the presence of slope failure on the
property in the middle of winter and under a two foot deep snow
cover.

Principles of comparative negligence should apply to

measure the quality of conduct between Bridlewood and the Russos
both individually and through their respective realtors.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE BRIDLEWOOD CORPORATION, AS SELLER, INTENTIONALLY CONCEALED
FROM THE RUSSOS, AS BUYER, INFORMATION THAT THE RESTAURANT
PROPERTY CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT SOIL STABILITY DEFECTS.
Liability for the intentional/reckless concealment
of material facts typically derive from a confidential or
fiduciary relationship existing between a plaintiff and defendant.
The maintenance of a confidential or fiduciary relationship
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between a plaintiff and defendant imposes upon the defendant the
affirmative duty to speak and disclose.

A defendant commits

fraud through the concealment or suppression of material
information when:
(a) The defendant has concealed or suppressed a material
fact;
(b) The defendant was in a fiduciary or confidential
relationship to the plaintiff;
(c) The defendant intentionally concealed or suppressed
a material fact with the intent to defraud the
plaintiff;
(d) The plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not
have acted as he did if he had known of the concealed
or suppressed fact;
(e) Finally, as a result of the concealment or
suppression of the fact, the plaintiff sustained
damage.
Blodgett v. Martsch, 590 P.2d 298 (Utah 1978), Elder v.
Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963), Cooper v.
Jevne, 128 Cal.Rptr. 724, (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1976).
Liability for the intentional/reckless concealment of material
facts has been invoked by this Court even where a confidential or
fiduciary relationship has not existed between the plaintiff and
the defendant.

A legal duty to communicate will arise where an

inequality of condition exists between the parties. The result
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follows that if a party to a contract or transaction possesses
material information not reasonably available to the other party
and which the latter cannot discover by reasonable dilligence,
the defendant has a legal duty to speak.
is actionable fraud.

The defendant's silence

Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah2d 379,

384 P.2d 802 (1963); Ellis v. Hale, 13 Utah2d 279,
373 P.2d 382 (1962); and see, Turnball v. Larose,
702 P.2d 1331 (Alaska 1985); Mitchell v. Straith,
40 Wash.App.405, 696 P.2d 609 (1985); Ogan v. Ellison,
297 Or. 25, 682 P.2d 760 (1984), Lingsch v. Savage,
19 Cal.Rptr. 201 (Cal.App. 1963).
The absence of a "protected relationship" between a seller
and a buyer in a real property transaction has produced the
general rule that a seller is under no duty to a buyer to
investigate and disclose material components within a real estate
transaction, even if not known to the buyer.

Cole v. Parker,

5 Utah 2d 263, 300 0.2d 623 (1956); Secor v. Knight,
716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986); Dugan v. Jones,
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).

This general rule, however, is

subject to significant exception.

Utah applies the majority rule

that where the seller knows facts materially affecting the value
or desirability of the property which are known or accessible
only to him and also knows that such facts are not known to or
within the dilligent attention and observation of the buyer, the
seller is under a duty to disclose those facts to the buyer.
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Dugan v, Jones, 615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) (negligent
misrepresentation by the seller and listing broker regarding the
amount of acreage for sale); Jardine v. Brunswick Corp,
18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659 (1967) (theory of negligent
misrepresentation approved - seller's disclosure obligation);
Elder v. Clawson, 14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963)
(intentional concealment of material facts by vendor and listing
agent regarding economic impact of noxious weed quarantine on
real property being sold); Turnball v. Larose,
702 P.2d 1331 (Alaska 1985) (intentional concealment of
information by vendor and broker from purchaser that lessee
intended to terminate lease thereby materially impairing the
investment value of the real property to the purchaser); Sorrell
v. Young, 6 Wash.App. 220, 491 P.2d 1312 (1971) (purchaser of lot
entitled to rescind because vendor intentionally concealed
information that lot had been built up to street level by
substantial placement of fill dirt); Obde v. Schlemeyer,
56 Wash.2d 449, 353 P.2d 672 (1960) (vendor intentionally failed
to disclose to purchaser that residence was infested with
termites - rescision allowed); Cooper v. Jevne,
128 Cal.Rptr. 724 (Cal.App. 2 Dist.1976) (allegations that vendor
and listing real estate agent knew of substantial structural
defects in condominiums - intentional concealment action - rule
of law approved that where seller and listing estate agent know
facts materially affecting value and desirability of property
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offered for sale and such facts are known or accessible only to
them and seller and agent also know that such facts are not known
to or within reasonable reach of the diligent attention and
observation of the buyer, seller and listing agent are each under
a duty to disclose such facts to buyer); Lingsch v. Savage,
29 Cal.Rptr. 201, (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1963) (vendor and broker
intentionally concealed from purchasers information that building
was in state of disrepair and had been placed for condemnation
by city officials - liability of vendor and real estate broker to
purchaser for intentional concealment of material facts affecting
value and desirability of property).
The Utah Supreme Court decision in Elder v. Clawson,
14 Utah 2d 379, 384 P.2d 802 (1963) represents the application of
fraud liability based upon the intentional concealment of
material facts.

The Court there held that the seller and its

real estate agent had intentionally failed to disclose to the
buyer the existence of a government imposed quarantine resulting
from the presence of a noxious weed upon the real property which
had been purchased by the defendant and the economic impact of
that quarantine on the operation of the land.

The seller's

intentional suppression of these material facts within a
transaction for which it possessed superior knowledge, not within
the fair and reasonable reach of the defendant, was held to be
fraud.
The Russos accept the Findings of Fact entered by the
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trial court in this action,

(Tr. at 112 - 116). The Russos also

agree that the acts and omissions of their real estate agent are
chargeable to them just as Bridlewood is bound by the acts and
omissions of its listing real estate agent, Robert Penton. The
Russos challenge, however, those conclusions of law entered by
the trial court that:
(a) The contents of Pentonfs January 1984 telephone
conversation to Brown was a sufficient disclosure by Bridlewood
(the seller) to place the Russos (the buyer) on notice that slope
failure conditions were present on the east side of the
restaurant property which materially affected its value and
desirability.
(b) The Russos (through Brown) failed to meet their
obligation to investigate the contents of Penton's disclosure
which failure was the sole and proximate cause of their damages.
The identified conclusions of law are inconsistent with
and are not supported by the trial courtfs Findings of Fact. The
cited conclusions of law ignore the knowledge of slope failure
both on the restaurant property and within the Birch Creek Gully
possessed by Bridlewood through its president, Clinton E. Frank.
The disclosure obligation of the seller to the Russos must be
measured by what Frank knew and not merely by what its listing
agent disclosed to the seller's agent in a fifteen minute
telephone conversation.

Godesky v. Provo City Corp.,

690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984) (test for proximate cause is whether a
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subsequent act, even if negligent, was reasonably foreseeable by
the tort-feasor).

Frank knew or was on notice of the following

slope failure conditions both on the restaurant property and
within Birch Creek Gully:
(a)

The west slope of the Birch Creek Gully was in

general slipping because of heavy water saturation received from
the 1982/1983 winter,
(b)

The slope failure mechanisms evident along the west

slope of the Birch Creek Gully had produced the slope failure on
the east side of the restaurant building,
(c)

The slope failure on the east side of the restaurant

property was evidenced by a radiating slippage line which
originated thirty feet from the building, ran parallel to the
crest of the gully, intersected into the east wall of the
building's foundation and thereafter traversed in a northward
direction under the concrete freezer pad, across the north
boundary of the restaurant property and into the adjacent
waterslide property,
(d)

The slippage pattern had been stable from August 1980

through November 1982,
(e)

The slippage pattern had doubled in depth from six

inches to one foot at the point where it intersected the building
and crossed under the concrete freezer pad during the 1982/8383
winter,
(f)

An engineer (Adarason) projected that further slope

failure on the east side of the building could occur the
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following year or not for the next fifty to one hundred years - a
projection largely dependent upon annual precipitation levels.
Frank never disclosed to Penton his acquired information
and personal observations of the restaurant property and of the
Birch Creek Gully.

What Penton understood about the east

boundary of the restaurant property from his conversations with
Wadraan is fractional compared to what Frank could have and should
have disclosed.
(a)

Penton understood only that:

Slippage was present under the concrete freezer pad

located at the northeast corner of the building,
(b)

Adamson had been retained by Wadman to look at

slippage on the property

and Adamsonfs opinion was that the

slippage would not cause future problems,
(c)

Brown should inform Russos that he had observed

slippage at the northeast corner of the building which was
located under the concrete freezer pad.
Penton had no knowledge that what he had seen under the
eight foot wide concrete freezer pad was part of a radiating
slippage line which began south of the restaurant building,
intersected into the building and thereafter traversed across the
property's north boundary and continued across the adjacent
property.

He additionally had no knowledge that the slope

failure mechanisms on the restaurant property existed generally
along the west slope of Birch Creek Gully.

Penton, like Brown

and like the Russos could not see these failure conditions

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
-28-

because of the two foot snow cover.

Penton's disclosure to Brown

was inadequate and incomplete for what existed on the property.
Brown justifiably confused Penton's disclosure of a slippage
problem at the northeast corner of the building with the slope
erosion caused by washout from the roof drainpipe.
Brown didn't disclose the Penton telephone conversation
with the Russos, he didn't communicate with Adarason and he didn't
return to the restaurant property for further inspection for the
same reason that Penton did not undertake such conduct - i.e.,
neither realtor had obtained a competent understanding of the
slope conditions on the restaurant property and consequently
neither realtor was concerned.

The absence of a slope failure

disclosure in the parties' February 6, 1984 closing documents
further confirms this lack of concern between the realtors and
their collective judgment that any such problems were merely
cosmetic.
The result follows that the contents of Penton's January
1984 telephone conversation to Brown was not a sufficient
disclosure to obligate the Russos either individually or through
Brown to further investigate and discover by their own resources
what Frank knew and intentionally failed to disclose.
could not disclose what he did not understand.

Penton

The Russos submit

that this lawsuit would never have been litigated if the slippage
on the east side of the restaurant property had been limited to
what Penton saw under the concrete freezer pad and what he
understood the slippage problem to be.
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POINT 2
THE BRIDLEWOOD CORPORATION, AS SELLER, EITHER INDIVIDUALLY OR
THROUGH ITS LISTING REAL ESTATE AGENT NEGLIGENTLY FAILED TO
INVESTIGATE AND TO DISCLOSE TO THE RUSSOS INFORMATION THAT THE
RESTAURANT PROPERTY CONTAINED SIGNIFICANT SOIL STABILITY DEFECTS.
The Utah Supreme Court has confirmed in Phillips v. J.CM.
Development Corp., 666 P.2d 876 (1983) that a real property owner
is subject to liability for the tortuous acts of its real estate
agent under the doctrine of respondeat superior.

Agency law

further requires that the knowledge of a real estate agent is
imputed to the employing real property owner.

Telling v. Eastern

and Pacific Enterprises,
702 P.2d 1232 (Wash.App. 1985).
Article Nine of the Code of Ethics of the National
Association of Realtors provides:
Realtors shall avoid exaggertion, misrepresentation,
or concealment of pertinent facts. He has an
affirmative obligation to discuss adverse factors
that a reasonably competent and dilligent investigation
would disclose.
The Arizona Supreme Court has held in Baker v. Leight,
370 P.2d 268 (Ariz. 1962) that an industry adopted code of ethics
will constitute the standard of care from which negligent or
fraudulent conduct can be measured and defined.
Utah law confirms that no fiduciary duty runs from a
listing real estate agent to the buyer.

The listing agent is

nonetheless required to meet standards of honesty, integrity,
truthfulness, reputation and competency.
615 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980).

Dugan v.Jones,

The application of this rule of law
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has been fully defined by the California Court of Appeals in
Lingsch v. Savage, 29 Cal.Rptr. 201, (Cal.App.1 Dist.1963) as
follows:
The real estate agent or broker representing the
seller is a party to the business transaction.
In most instances he has a personal interest in
it and derives a profit from it. Where such agent
or broker possesses, along with the seller, the
requisite knowledge according to the foregoing
decisions, whether he acquires it from, or
independently of, his principal, he is under the
same duty of disclosure. He is a party connected
with the fraud and if no disclosure is made at all
to the buyer by the other parties to the transaction,
such agent or broker becomes jointly and severally
liable with the seller for the full amount of the
damages. It is not necessary that there be a
contractual relationship between the agent or
broker and the buyer. Cit.29 Cal.Rptr. at 205.
The California state courts now apply the rule of law that
on agent's duty of care in a real estate transaction includes the
duty to conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of
property listed for sale in order to discover defects for the
benefit of the buyer.

The agent's failure to investigate,

discover and thereafter disclose such material defects to a
prospective purchaser of real property constitutes negligence.
Easton v. Strassburger,
199 Cal.Rptr. 383 (Cal.App.1 Dist.1984).

This rule of law has

similarly been applied by the New Mexico state courts in Gouveia
v. Citicorp Person-to-Person Financial Center, Inc., 101 N.M.572,
686 P.2d 262 (N.M.App. 1984).

The Utah Supreme Court has

approved by dicta the Easton v. Strassburger neligence standard
in Secor v. Knight, 716 P.2d 790 (Utah 1986).
The fact pattern in Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal.Rptr.
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383 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1984) applies to the facts at issue in this
action.

The litigation involved residential property which was

subjected to massive earth movement after purchase.

Expert

testimony established that earth slides had occurred because a
portion of the property was fill dirt which had not been properly
engineered and compacted.

The property owners did not tell the

purchaser about the slides or the corrective actions which had
been taken by them prior to the sale date.

Similarly, the owners

did not inform the listing broker and agents of these same slide
conditions and corrective actions.

Notwithstanding that the

listing broker and listing agents did not know of the property's
earth movement history, the evidence established that the listing
broker and agents were aware of certain "red flags" which should
have indicated to them that soil problems were present.

Even

though the listing broker and agents were on notice of soil
stability problems, neither of them requested soil stability
evaluations for the property nor did any of them inform the buyer
of the potential soil problems.

The California Court of Appeals

rejected the listing broker's argument that it should be liable
only for concealment or suppression of facts known to it or its
agent.

The California Court of Appeals instead held that the

duty of the listing real estate broker, to disclose facts
includes the affirmative duty to conduct a reasonably competent
and diligent inspection of the property listed for sale and to
disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting
the value or desirability of the property that such an
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investigation would reveal.

The rationale for the

California

Court of Appeals ruling is stated as follows:
• • •

If a broker were required to disclose only known
defects, but not also those that are reasonably
discoverable, he would be shielded by his ignorance
of that which he holds himself out to know. The
rule thus narrowly construed would have results
inimical to the policy upon which it is based.
Such a construction would not only reward the
unskilled broker for his own incompetence, but
might provide the unscrupulous broker the
unilateral ability to protect himself at the
expense of the inexperienced and unwary who rely
upon him. 199 Cal.Rptr. at 388.
Russos submit that the negligence standard set forth
within Easton v. Strassburger has direct application to
Bridlewood (the seller) as well as to each of the real estate
agents.

Both Bridlewood as well as Penton and Brown should be

obligated as a matter of law, to disclose to the Russos not only
facts known to each of them but also to disclose facts which
should be known to them through reasonable and competent
investigation.

Bridlewood should not be allowed to shield itself

from its failure or Pentonfs failure to investigate and disclose
because of the superseding conduct of Brown.

Godesky v. Provo

City Corp., 690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984) (Superseding cause should
rarely, if ever, be a basis for dismissal or summary judgment test for proximate cause is whether a subsequent act, even if
negligent, was foreseeable by the original tort-feasor); accord,
Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985).
Brown's failure to independently investigate the
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information contained within PentonTs January 1984 telephone call
and to disclose such acquired information to the Russos may
constitute negligence.

Brown's conduct, however, was no

different from that of Penton.

Penton told Brown what Penton

understood, however imperfectly, of his earlier conversation with
Wadman.

Brown did not further investigate and the trial court

found as a matter of law that Brown's failure to act was
negligent.

Undisputed is that Penton himself did not further

investigate.

PentonTs duty of care as a listing agent cannot be

any less than Brown's and indeed under the Strassburger rule
Penton's duty is greater.

The seller's obligation to disclose

(which here includes the duty to investigate) should be measured
by what Frank knew or should have known.

Bridlewood should not

be shielded from negligence liability because of Penton's
superseding conduct or that of Brown's.

The insufficiency of

Penton's disclosures to Brown are certainly a foreseeable product
of Frank's election to both ignore the importance of this
information and to not disclose any part of it to either Penton
or to the Russos.
in this case.

Comparative negligence standards should apply

The application of comparative negligence

standards should compare the conduct of Frank on the one hand and
the conduct of Brown on the other.

Bridlewood Corporation

(through Frank) should not be allowed to have its standard of
care measured merely by what Penton fortuitously discovered
through Wadman and thereafter disclosed to Brown.

What the

Bridlewood Corporation knew or should have known can only be
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properly defined by what its president, Clinton E. Frank, knew or
should have known of slope failure conditions on the east side of
the restaurant property,

Russos submit that the clear result of

such a comparative negligence application would be that the
negligence of the Bridlewood Corporation would exceed any
negligence attributable to the acts and omissions of the Russos
through their real estate agent, Steven Brown.

CONCLUSION

The August 12, 1986 judgment entered in the District Court
of Weber County, Utah should be reversed with this action
remanded for trial on the merits or in the alternative for a
directed judgment in favor of Plaintiffs.
DATED this 24th day of December, 1986.
lesp^tfully s&bmittec
PATTERSOV AND

WTTERSON

PHILIP C\ PMTTERSON
Attorney for\ Appellants
427 - 27th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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